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the statement for the reason that it is contemplated that, if
appellant should prevail on this appeal, the case will be remanded to the trial court for a determination of that question.
In .view of this stipulation and the fact that the question has
not been argued on this appeal, no opinion is expressed on the
matter of salary.
[14] The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial
court to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred m the judgment.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 18,
1951.

[S. F. No. 18149.
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THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALBERT J. LEVIN, Respondent, v.
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., Defendants;
FRED A. WICKETT, Intervener and Appellant.
[1] Counties-Charters.-If an irregularity in the proceedings by
local authorities for the adoption of a county charter appears
on the face of the legislative resolution approving the charter,
the approval of the Legislature is not conclusive, and the
court will examine the regularity of the proceedings and
determine whether or not the constitutional requirements have
been met and whether the document submitted is a valid
county charter.
[2a, 2b] ld.-Charters.-Where it appears on the face of a legislative resolution approving a county charter that in five of
the ten required publications before submission to the electorate a portion of the contents was so garbled as to make
three sections of the charter unintelligible, there is not such a
compliance with constitutional requirements as to constitute
the document a valid charter.
[3] !d.-Charters.-In view of Const., art. I, § 22, compliance with
constitutional requirements with regard to adoption of county
charters (see art. I, § 7ljz), is mandatory and prohibitory.
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 418.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Counties, § 6.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. James L. Atteridge, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to determine validity of a county charter.
ment for plaintiff affirmed.

Judg-

Campbell, Hayes & Custer, Edwin J. Owens and Robert E.
Hayes for Intervener and Appellant.
Frederick N. Howser, J. B. Peckham, John M. Machado,
Peter J. Mancuso and Raymond G. Callaghan for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-The trial court invalidated a charter adopted
by defendant, Santa Clara County (Stats. 1949, Cone. & Joint
Resol., ch. 156, p. 3294) pursuant to section 7lj2 of article XI
of the Constitution on the ground that the publication of the
charter prior to the vote thereon was faulty.
A charter may be adopted by a county by following specified
procedure set forth in the Constitution. After a board of
freeholders has been elected and drafted a proposed charter,
the county board of supervisors ''shall thereupon cause said
proposed charter to be published for at least 10 times in a
daily newspaper of general circulation, printed, published and
circulated in said county ... " (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7lj2 ).
Thereafter the charter is submitted to the electors. After it
is adopted by the electorate, it is submitted to the Legislature,
which must approve or reject it as a whole before it becomes
effective. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 71/2.)
Here the charter was approved by the electors. Proceedings
were then instituted to prevent its submission to the Legislature on the same ground advanced in the instant case (defect
in publication) but they were unsuccessful. (Santa Clara
County v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.2d 552 [203 P.2d 1].) The
charter was submitted to the Legislature and a resolution approving it was adopted. (Stats. 1949, p. 3294, Cone. & Joint
Resol., ch. 156.) The resolution recites, however, the proceedings by the local authorities, stating that the charter was
published for at least 10 days (September 16th to September
25th, inclusive) but "That during the course of the ten day
publication of the . . . Charter as aforesaid, in certain publications thereof, to-wit, in those published and circulated on
the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st days of September, 1948,
there was a break in the sequence of the context of the Charter, which break arose from the fact that certain sections of
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said Charter, as more particularly set forth in Exhibit 'C'
annexed hereto, were not in numerical sequence nor were the
sentences in Sections 202, 303 and 402 as appearing in said
publications (see Exhibit 'C ') in exact conformance with the
sections of the proposed Charter. That in the printing, publishing, and circulating of said proposed Charter on the 16th,
22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th days of September, 1948 the wording
thereof was in exact conformance of the Charter as prepared
and proposed by the duly elected and qualified Board of fifteen Freeholders and as submitted and filed thereby.
''That attached hereto, marked Exhibit 'B,' and made a
part hereof by this express reference and incorporation is
a newspaper publication of said proposed Charter in the
San Jose Mercury Herald as it was published on the 16th,
22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th days of September, 1948.
"That attached hereto, marked Exhibit 'C', and made a
part hereof by this express reference and incorporation is
a newspaper publication of said proposed Charter in the San
Jose Mercury Herald as it was published on the 17th, 18th,
19th, 20th, and 21st days of September, 1948." (Stats. 1949,
ch. 156, p. 3296.) It is that defect in publication which it is
claimed voided the charter. It must first be determined, however, to what extent, if at all, a court will examine the regularity of charter adoption proceedings occurring before the
passage of the resolution by the Legislature approving the
charter.
It has been held that when an act of the Legislature is
valid on its face, properly enrolled, authenticated and filed, it
is conclusively presumed that all of the steps required for its
passage have been properly taken; even the journal of the
Legislature is not available to impeach it. (Spaulding v.
Desmond, 188 Cal. 783 [207 P. 896]; Sherman v. Story, 30
Cal. 253 [89 Am.Dec. 93], overruling Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal.
165; County of Yolo v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 265 [64 P. 403, 84
Am.St.Rep. 41] ; People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560; People v. Harlan,
133 Cal. 16 [65 P. 9]; Park1:nson v. Johnson, 160 Cal. 756
rn7 P. 10571; Taylor v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327 [257 P. 40];
People v. Camp, 42 Cal.App. 411 f183 P. 845] ; People v. Peete,
54 Cal.App. 333 r202 P. 51); see Oroville & V. R. R. Co. v.
Plumas County, 37 Cal. 354; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal.
189 r2 Am.Rep. 432) ; Sacramento Paving Co. v. Anderson,
1 Cal.App. 672 r82 P. 10691 ; Santa Clara County v. Superior
Court, S7tpra, 33 Cal.2d 552.)
That rule has been criticized. (1 Stanford L.Rev., 428;
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Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.) §§ 1403-6.) Elsewhere the authorities are split, some holding that they will
look behind the statute. It has been said: "Where the failure
of constitutional compliance in the enactment of statutes is
not discoverable from the face of the act itself but may be
demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates,
committee reports, or papers of the governor, courts have used
several conflicting theories with which to dispose of the issue.
They have held : ( 1) that the enrolled bill is conclusive and
like the sheriff's return cannot be attacked; (2) that the
enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only in case the legislative journal shows affirmative contradiction of the constitutional requirement will the bill be held invalid; (3) that
although the enrolled bill is prima facie correct, evidence from
the journals or other extrinsic sources is admissible to strike
the bill down; ( 4) that the legislative journal is conclusive
and the enrolled bill is valid only if it accords with the rBcital
in the journal and the constitutional procedure . . . . At the
present time the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment
of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the
third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity
which may be attacked by any authoritative source of information." (Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.)
§ 1402.) Starting with the premise that the approval or rejection of a county or city home rule charter by the Legislature and the steps taken by the local authorities, including
the vote of the people, are a part of the process of enacting
a legislative act (Santa Clara County v. Superior Court,
supra, 33 Cal.2d 552; Taylor v. Cole, supra, 201 Cal. 327;
Spaulding v. Desmond, supra, 188 Cal. 783), this court has
extended the rule to include such steps and held that it will
not look beyond the resolution of the Legislature approving
the charter. (Taylor v. Cole, S?tpra; Spaulding v. Desmond,
supra; People v. City of San Buenavent1tra, 213 Cal. 637
r3 P.2d 3] .) And in reaching that result, Taylor v. Cole,
supra, overruled People v. Gunn, 85 Cal. 238 [24 P. 718].
In the Gunn case, it was claimed that the charter had not
received sufficient votes and other constitutional provisions
had not been followed. The court held that the I.Jegislature
does not exercise legislative or "Jaw making" power in approving or rejecting a charter, and hence cannot determine
the regularity of the proceedings by the local authorities for
the adoption of the charter; that such is a court function.
Following the Taylor case is People v. City of San Buenaven-
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tura, supra, 213 Cal. 637, where the defect was a failure to
advertise the charter. The Taylor case was approved in its holding that ''. . . a legislative resolution approving a freeholders'
charter, together with the charter which it establishes is the
law of the state, and is conclusive as to the facts so recited
'in the prearnble." But the court concluded by stating: "As
it appears on the face of the assembly concurrent resolution
approving the charter that one of the essential steps required
by the Constitution to be taken for the adoption and approval
by the voters of a municipal freeholders' charter was not taken
in this instance, we are compelled to hold that the freeholders'
charter of San Buenaventura, submitted to the electors of the
city, not having been legally adopted, its purported approval
by the legislature amounts to nothing." (Emphasis added.)
(People v. City of San Buenaventura, 213 Cal. 637, 640, 642
[3 P.2d 3].) [1] Thus the holding is that if irregularity in
the proceedings by the local authorities appears on the face
of the legislative resolution, the approval by the Legislature
is not conclusive, as it would be, if it was not revealed by the
resolution. The San Buenaventura case was followed by
Butters v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Cal. 515 [19 P.2d 983]
and Ault v. Council of City of San Rafael, 17 Cal.2d 415 [110
P.2d 379], where the court gave consideration to the regularity of the proceedings by local authorities before the charter was submitted to the Legislature, but did not discuss the
question of the jurisdiction of the Legislature to determine
that question by approving or rejecting the charter, a problem later herein discussed. The distinction made in the San
Buenaventura case (between a defect in the local proceedings
appearing on the face of the resolution and one that did not)
was approved by this court in Santa Clara County v. Superior
Court, supra, 33 Cal.2d 552, the latest case on the subject,
for there it was concluded that the proceedings taken by the
local authorities were a part of the legislative process and
we there approved Taylor v. Cole, supra, 201 Cal. 327, saying
that the constitution imposed upon the Legislature the duty
of seeing that the steps taken by the local authorities complied with the constitution when it authorized the Legislature
to approve or reject the charter in toto. People v. City of San
Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637, was also approved, however, in holding that the charter could be attacked where the
defect appeared on the face of the legislative resolution.
Since the defect in the proceedings for the adoption of the
charter prior to its submission to the Legislature appears on
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the face of the resolution adopted by the Legislature approving the charter here involved, the court will examine the
regularity of such proceedings and determine whether or not
the constitutional requirements have been met and the docu~
ment submitted is or is not a valid county charter.
[2a] On the question of the sufficiency of the publication,
it appears on the face of the resolution adopted by the Legislature (quoted supra) that five publications were an exact
copy of the charter. In the other five, the following errors
were made in which parts of the context of some sections were
placed in other sections, as follows : The charter correctly
reading is : ''Section 202. Qualification of Supervisors. The
County of Santa Clara shall have a board of Supervisors consisting of five members, one member to be elected from each
supervisorial district. In order to be eligible for election or
appointment each supervisor must have been a qualified elector
in the district he represents for the period of at least two
years immediately preceding his election or appointment,
and must continue to reside therein during his incumbency
in office.
''Section 303. Clerk of the Board of Supervisors. The
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors shall keep the minutes
of said board and shall make full records of all proceedings
had before it and shall have custody of all minutes, books, and
records pertaining to such proceedings and shall render all
clerical services required in the conduct of the business of
said board or incidental thereto.
''Section 402. Term of Office and Emoluments. The County
Executive shall serve at the will of the appointing authority,
provided however, that the County Executive first appointed
under this charter may not be removed within one (1) year
from the date on which he assumes his duties except for
cause which would justify the removal of an elected county
officer under the provisions of general law.
''The County Executive shall receive a salary which shall
be fixed by the Board of Supervisors prior to his appointment,
and annually thereafter, in the salary ordinance, except that
in the first five years of the operation of this charter the salary
shall in no instance be less than $10,000 per annum.''
But as published it read: ''Section 202. Qualification of
Supervisors. The County of Santa Clara shall have a Board
of Supervisors consisting of five members, one member to be
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elected from each supervisorial district, in the conduct of the
business of said board or incidental thereto.
''Section 303. Clerk of the Board of Supervisors. The
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors shall keep the minutes of
said board and shall make full records of all proceedings had
before it and shall have custody of all minutes, books, and
records pertaining to such proceedings and shall render all
clerical services required duties except for cause which would
justify the removal of an elected county officer under the provisions of general law.
"The County Executive shall receive a salary which shall
be fixed by the Board of Supervisors prior to his appointment,
and annually thereafter, in the salary ordinance, except that
in the first five years of the operation of this charter the salary shall in no instance be less that $10,000 per annum.
''Section 402. Term of Office and Emoluments. The
County Executive shall serve at the will of the appointing
authority, provided, however, that the County Executive first
appointed under this charter may not be removed within one
(1) year from the date on which he assumes his. In order to
be eligible for election or appointment each supervisor must
have been a qualified elector in the district he represents for
the period of at least two years immediately preceding his
election or appointment, and must continue to reside therein
during his incumbency in office."
The portion in italics is the misplaced material. It is thus
seen that although all of the contents of the charter was published for 10 days, yet on 5 days, a portion of the contents
was garbled. It should be clear that the error rendered five
publications, as to three sections of the charter, in part, unintelligible. The sections are widely spaced and it would take
a diligent search to bring the contents together to make sense.
The effect is not only the same as if material were omitted
from three sections of the charter, but an erroneous impression
would be gained as to the meaning of the part not omitted.
[3] Compliance with constitutional requirements is mandatory and prohibitory (Cal. Const., art. l, § 22; People v.
Gunn, supra, 85 Cal. 238; People v. City of San Buenaventura,
supra, 213 Cal. 637; Santa Clara County v. Superior Court,
supra, 33 Cal.2d 552; Blanchard v. Hart well, 131 Cal. 263
[63 P. 3491 ). [2b] While substantial compliance has been
held. to suffice under some circumstances (see California Teachers Assn .. v. Collins, 1 Ca1.2d. 202 [34 P.2d 134]; Perry v.
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Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 94 [207 P.2d 47]) such compliance, as
above indicated, is not present in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The solution of this controversy appears to rest upon the
determination of two main questions: First, whether substantial compliance with our constitutional provisions will suffice
to render valid the adoption of a proposed county charter;
and second, if so, whether there was such substantial compliance in the present case. In my opinion, both questions should
be answered in the affirmative.
While the majority opinion concedes that ''substantial compliance will suffice (Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 94 [207
P.2d 47]; California Teachers Assn. v. Collins, 1 Cal.2d 202
[34 P.2d 134] ), there is contrary language in certain earlier
decisions of this court (People v. City of San Buenaventura,
213 Cal. 637 [3 P.2d 3] ; People v. Gunn, 85 Cal. 238 [24 P.
718]) . In my opinion the language found in those earlier
cases should be disapproved, for such language is not in harmony with the position taken by this court in the later cases
above cited. Furthermore, to hold that an absolutely literal
compliance in every phase of every step is a prerequisite to
the adoption of a valid charter is to exalt form above substance, and wonld compel the invalidation of charter proceedings for the failure to dot an "i" or to cross a "t," or for
any other minor defect in a publication which might be of no
substaptial significance. Any such rule would tend to bring
the law into disrepute and to give color to the claim that justice is administered in a hypertechnical manner without regard
to the realities.
Assuming, then, that a substantial compliance with our
constitutional provisions is sufficient, the facts presented by
the record before us clearly show such substantial compliance.
It is not claimed that any step required by the Constitution
was entirely omitted, but only that one of the steps was imperfectly executed in that 5 of the 10 required publications of the
proposed charter were not letter perfect. Between the first
publication on September 16, 1948, and the last four publications on September 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1948, all of which
publications were "in exact conformance" with the sections
of the proposed charter, there were certain errors made in
the five intervening publications, which errors are set forth
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in ·the majority opinion. In these intervening publications
the entire text was published but there was a slight transposition in three out of 71 sections of the charter. It seems entirely clear that the errors were of a minor nature, and that
the effect, if any, upon the electors who might have read the
slightly erroneous publications, instead of the perfect publications, would have been to incline such electors to vote
against, rather than in favor of, the adoption of the proposed
charter. The charter was nevertheless approved by a large
majority of the electors. I therefore believe that it should be
held here that there was a substantial compliance, for any other
conclusion will result in thwarting the will of the vast majority
of the electors without any compelling reason for so doing.
The disapproval of certain language used in People v. City
of San Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637, would not imply
that the decision should be overruled. The situation in that
case is clearly distinguishable. There it affirmatively appeared
on the face of the concurrent resolution that one entire step
required by the Constitution for the adoption of a charter
had been omitted. It was there held that it is not for the
courts to say that such entire step could be omitted when the
Constitution provided otherwise. But if, as here, it affirmatively appears on the face of the concurrent resolution that
every step was completed in exact conformance with the constitutional requirements, except for certain typographical
errors which crept into some of the publications involved in
completing the publication step, then it is for the courts to
determine whether such errors were of such minor nature that
there was nevertheless substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements.
As stated by Mr. Justice McFarland in his concurring
opinion in People v. Gunn, supra, 85 Cal. 238, 250: "Because
the constitution declares the provisions to be mandatory, it
does not follow that a substantial compliance with them is not
sufficient. The proceedings for the adoption of a charter will
probably never be so literally perfect that a critical and hostile eye cannot detect in them some slight defect or irregularity, which ought not to be considered fatal. Whether or
not there has been a sufficient compliance with the constitution in any particular case must depend on the particular
facts of that case."
That principle has been adopted in the more recent decisions
above cited. It is not necessary here to attempt to specify
the limits of those minor errors which may be deemed to be
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inconsequential within the substantial compliance rule. It
seems clear, however, that if, as in the present case, it may be
said with certainty that such minor errors in certain publications could have tended only to result in unfavorable, rather
than favorable, votes on the question of the adoption of the
proposed charter, then such errors should be held to be so
inconsequential as not to invalidate the entire proceedings for
the adoption of the proposed charter.
The Legislature here has approved the proposed charter
despite the minor errors in some of the publications. It has
impliedly found and concluded that there was .a substantial
compliance with the constitutional provisions. It has frankly
shown the extent of such minor errors on the face of the
concurrent resolution so as to permit judicial review of its
findings and conclusions under the rules set forth in Taylor
v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327 [257 P. 40], and People v. City of San
Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637. Upon this judicial review, I am of the opinion that the Legislature was correct in
its findings and conclusions, and that this judicial review
should result in the validation, rather than the invalidation of
the charter.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the
trial court, with directions to enter judgment in favor of defendants.
Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Intervener and appellant's petition for a rehearing was
denied June 25, 1951. Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence,
J., voted for a rehearing.

